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Since the mid-eighties Brazil lived through a period of great macroeconomic instability.
Examining the evolution of the primary balance during these years, one identifies three markedly
distinct periods: 1985 to 1989, 1990 to 1994, and 1995-96. The average primary surplus
increased from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1985-89, to 3.1 percent in 1990-94, falling back to less than
0.1 percent of GDP in 1995-96. The reduction in the operational deficit between 1985-89 and
1990-94 reached almost 5.5 percent of GDP, with more than half of the improvement coming
from falling interest payments. Between 1990-94 and 1995-96,  the operational deficit widened by
4.5 percent of GDP. Only less than a third of that variation may be attributed to rising interest
payments. All the rest came from the vanishing primary surplus.
During most of this period, the Brazilian economy was subject to very high inflation rates and to
an uneven GDP growth performance. It is well known that fluctuations in these variables impact
public sector’s tax revenues and expenditures, having important effects on the observed changes
in the fiscal deficit. In order to produce a more accurate picture of the prevailing fiscal trends in
the Brazilian economy, alternative indicators of fiscal policy are constructed. One of them is a
modified version of the fiscal impulse measure proposed by Blanchard (1990), in  which the
different components of the primary deficit are adjusted for variations both in the activity level
and the inflation rate. The fiscal impulse measure shows, on average, a more expansionist fiscal
policy stance than the change in the actual primary deficit during the period 1989-1996. While the
estimated measure indicates more expansionist or less contractionist policies than the observed
values for 1989-90 and 1994-96, it also shows that the actual change in the primary deficit
significantly underestimates the contraction in fiscal policy in 1991-1992. For 1993, there is no
significant difference between the two measures.
The understanding of the determinants of public-sector debt dynamics is a key step towards a
fuller assessment of fiscal sustainability in the Brazilian economy. The public-sector net debt has
increased from 28.5 percent of GDP in December 1994 to 34.4 per cent in December 1996. More
than two thirds of that increase stemmed from the net debt of the federal government and the
Central Bank. The evolution of federal net-debt figures should be seen with caution. Though the
federal net debt has really increased much less dramatically than the federal gross debt since 1994,
the slower increase conceals a deterioration of the quality of the net-debt that deserves some
attention.
The high interest rates resulting from the combination of a lax fiscal policy and a tight monetary
stance have had a severe impact on the accounts of state and municipal governments. And the
combination of high interest rates and the sudden end of the high-inflation regime precipitated the
already expected going under of the most fragile part of the banking system, largely constituted by
banks controlled by the states. As high-interest state bonds are being swapped for lower interest
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federal bonds, the states’ debt is being largely converted into debt to the federal government and,
therefore, being subtracted from the federal gross debt in the net-debt figures. Analogously, non-
performing assets of the insolvent banks transferred to the Central Bank, as well as low-interest
loans extended to the institutions that absorbed those banks, are also being deducted from the
federal gross debt. As the importance of those various assets has been growing very rapidly there
is every reason to believe that the quality of the federal net-debt figures is being negatively
affected.
Besides the macroeconomic policy mix, at least three other factors are important determinants of
the public-sector debt dynamics. The first refers to the existence of contingent and hidden
liabilities. When liabilities of that sort appear, as skeletons taken out of the closet, they become
normal registered debt. In Brazil, the most important of those liabilities stems from the federal
guarantee granted to  the Mortgage Assistance Fund (Fundo de  Compensação de  Variações
Salariais, FCVS). Another liability of that kind stems from the inability of the federal government
to collect certain debts that are being considered as assets in its balance sheet. The still hidden
costs of the bailing out of the failing banks and the restructuring of the states’ debt are bound to
comprise an important part of the “skeletons in the closet”.
The second important determinant of the public-sector debt dynamics is the flow of privatization
proceeds, which are expected to reach a peak in 1998 and as much as US$ 80 billion over the
period 1997-2002.  The effect of privatization on public-sector debt dynamics will depend, not so
much on the flow of privatization proceeds, but on the part of that flow effectively channeled into
debt redemption. Finally, a third important determinant of the public-sector debt dynamics is the
extent  of  the financing that could stem from  seigniorage. As almost three years after the
launching of the stabilization program, the monetary base is still limited to about 2.8 per cent of
GDP, the contribution of seigniorage to public-deficit financing is bound to be extremely limited.
Three different scenarios were initially considered in the model used to simulate debt dynamics in
the paper, their differences being the assumptions about the evolution of the primary balance. In
the first scenario, there is no fiscal adjustment whatsoever. The zero primary balance observed in
1996 is repeated year after year till 2002. The second scenario has the primary balance improving
slowly, though steadily, over the simulation period, reaching 2 percent of GDP in 2002. Finally, in
the third scenario, the primary balance jumps to 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1997 and stays at this
level till the end of the period under consideration. The same set of assumptions about the
evolution of public assets sales, emergence of contingent and hidden liabilities and external
interest rate was adopted in all three scenarios. Also invariant were the assumptions about
inflation, exchange-rate policy and growth performance during the period.
In Scenario 1, in which a no-improvement path for the primary balance is envisaged, the public-
sector net debt jumps from 34.4 percent of GDP in 1996 to 50 percent in 2002. Scenario 3, that
assumes an effort that leads to a primary surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP in 1997, which is
maintained over the rest of the period, tells a different story. The public-sector net debt as a
proportion of GDP would rise in 1997 and start to fall from 1998 on, reaching 32.2 percent of
GDP in 2002, somewhat below the base-year mark. Scenario 2, represents a halfway case, in
which the primary balance describes a slow, though steady, upward movement over the period,5
reaching 2 percent of GDP in 2002. The net debt would be rising till 2001 but would fall back
slightly to 36.2 percent of GDP in 2002. All those results proved to be very sensitive to some of
the adopted assumptions, especially those concerning the GDP growth path over the period and
the amount of privatization proceeds that will be effectively used to redeem public debt
The simulation exercises conducted with the debt-dynamics model were based on scenarios that
assumed exogenous primary-balance paths. Though that proved to be a convenient way to
concentrate the focus of the analysis on the debt-dynamics process, important questions were left
unanswered. How plausible are the assumptions on the primary-balance path adopted in those
scenarios? What is the likely evolution of the primary balance over the coming years after all? In
order to address these fundamental questions, the simulation model was extended to allow an
endogenous determination of the primary balance.
The possibilities for improvement in the public-sector primary balance in the coming years are
constrained by severe rigidities and adverse structural trends. The 1988 Constitution redesigned
the previous system of fiscal federalism and the central government lost a substantial part of its
tax revenue to state and local governments, without being able to transfer to them any significant
part of its spending programs. In addition, the new Constitution amplified the scope for the
historical rent-seeking behavior of many segments of the Brazilian society, imposing on the
federal budget a considerable additional burden, exactly when the Union's fiscal resources were
being reduced.
The new Constitution brought a very high degree of rigidity to public sector payroll expenditures.
All public employees of federal, state and local governments in official civil-servant careers were
granted lifetime job tenure. At the federal level, the establishment of a single civil-service code
resulted in the extension of all compensation privileges of the official civil-servant career to about
400 thousand employees, previously hired under the rules of private-sector working contracts.
The impact on the cost of retirement benefits was particularly important. In contrast to private-
sector employees, all public servants are now entitled to a retirement pay that is in general at least
equivalent to the value of the last paycheck before retirement.
“Redemption of the social debt” was a key expression during the drafting of the 1988
Constitution. In practice it meant putting the expansion of entitlement programs in a fast track.
Social insurance benefits were significantly extended, an income-maintenance program for
unemployed workers was created and the right to free access to health care programs was
established. The fiscal pressure coming from the present social security system in Brazil probably
is the most important aspect to be considered in the assessment of structural trends.
With a gross tax burden in excess of 30 percent of GDP, Brazil is a clear outlier among countries
with a similar stage of development. If there is little hope of a sizable relief from the revenue side,
there are also strong reasons to believe that keeping expenditures under control will depend less
and less of simple fiscal repression measures. There is ample evidence that the political costs of
recurrent fiscal repression are in fact contributing to erode the already precarious political
coalition that seems to support a major fiscal adjustment effort in the country.6
In the simulations that involve an endogenous determination of the primary balance, three
different scenarios were again considered. The differences stem from values attributed to a set of
parameters identified as having a key role in the determination of the public-sector expenditures.
Assumptions concerning the evolution of the revenues of all levels of government were kept
invariant across the three scenarios. Attention was concentrated on the behavior of payroll
expenditures, social-security benefits and health-programs expenditures.
Simulation results for Scenario A show an improving primary balance which resembles the
exogenously assumed path of Scenario 2, considered in the debt dynamics model, but the
improvement seems a bit less strong, the primary surplus reaching only 1.6 percent of GDP in
2002. In scenario B, the primary balance path shows a much slower upward movement. In 2002,
the primary surplus is only half percent of GDP. Finally, the primary-balance path of Scenario C
seems to be even worse than the one exogenously assumed in Scenario 1 of the debt dynamics
model. Instead of a no-improving primary balance, one now gets a slowly worsening one, with the
primary deficit reaching 0.8 percent of GDP in 2002.
The simulation results with the extended model suggest that the public sector primary-balance
path over the coming years could be quite different from those assumed in the debt-dynamics
simulation exercises. A natural extension, therefore, is to reexamine some debt-dynamics issues
based on the endogenously-generated primary-balance paths, while keeping the same common set
of assumptions of  the original debt dynamics exercise.
The three endogenous primary-balance paths lead to well different consequences in terms of debt
dynamics. The public-sector net debt rises very markedly even in Scenario A, which is the most
favorable one. The net debt rises from 34.4 percent of GDP in 1996 to 37.9 percent of GDP in
2002. After increasing in 1997, the operational deficit falls steadily to 1.7 percent of GDP in
2002. The worst case is generated by the deteriorating primary balance of Scenario C. Fueled by
soaring interest payments, the net debt jumps to 55.9 percent of GDP in 2002, and the operational
deficit reaches 9.3 percent of GDP. Scenario B constitutes an intermediate case, in which the net
debt rises to 45.1 percent of GDP and the operational deficit remains at a level quite similar to the
base-year value. Sensitivity-analysis exercises leave no doubts about the crucial importance of the
assumptions on economic growth performance.
What conclusions about fiscal sustainability in Brazil can be drawn from the paper? If a
sustainable fiscal policy is defined as a policy such that the public debt to GDP ratio eventually
converges back to some determined level, the answer is clear: the present fiscal stance is not
sustainable. If the current tax rules and spending programs are maintained, the debt to GDP ratio
will grow rapidly in the near future.
Under reasonable sets of assumptions, the simulation exercises of the paper have shown that a
sharp increase in the public sector net debt, as a proportion of GDP, will be unavoidable if there is
no improvement in the primary balance in coming years. But even with a significant improvement
in the primary balance during the period, the net-debt to GDP ratio would still show an upward
trend and public sector real interest payments would not fall, unless extremely optimistic
assumptions on GDP growth are made.7
Given the obstacles currently faced by fiscal-adjustment efforts, there is a widespread temptation
in Brazil to believe that the country may simply grow out of its fiscal problems. If fiscal repression
could produce a slowly increasing primary surplus in the near future, one could cross one’s
fingers and hope that economic growth will save the day and lead naturally to a significant
improvement in fiscal indicators. Much as an overfed boy that dreams about getting rid of his
obesity problems by simply maintaining his present weight while growing taller.
There are many reasons to believe that growing out of fiscal problems in Brazil will not be so
easy. A slow improvement in the fiscal-stance will mean that for a long time interest rates will
have to remain much higher than would be compatible with a growth-conducive economic
environment. In addition, long-lasting fiscal repression means public investment deficiencies that
will also hamper fast economic growth. Finally, the recent evolution of the Brazilian external
accounts, marked by a large and rapidly widening current account deficit, suggests that a faster
growth rate will probably be unfeasible. And also that the convergence of domestic interest rates
to international levels may end up being much slower than assumed in the most  optmistic
scenarios of the paper.
It seems, therefore, that there is no easy way out. In order to interrupt the vicious circle of bad
fiscal stance, high interest rates, slow growth and even worse fiscal stance (and greater external
vulnerability), there seems to be no other alternative than a decisive effort to improve the primary
balance. It is highly unrealistic to expect that the already high tax burden can be further increased.
Improvements in the primary balance will have to come, therefore, from expenditure reduction.
Given the rigidities in the public sector payroll, the fiscal pressure coming from the social security
system and the expansion in expenditures with health assistance programs, it is unlikely that the
necessary expenditure cuts will be viable without a major fiscal reform. There seems to be no way
to circumvent a deep change in the very nature of the fiscal regime that only constitutional
amendments will make feasible.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief overview of recent fiscal
developments in the Brazilian economy making use of traditional fiscal policy indicators. In
Section 3, alternative indicators are constructed and used to reassess past fiscal policy episodes.
The next three sections examine the implications of current fiscal trends for the sustainability of
fiscal policy in Brazil. Section 4 uses a model to simulate the Brazilian debt dynamics process
assuming exogenous primary-balance paths. Section 5 discusses the likely evolution of the
primary balance in the coming years. In Section 6, the simulation model from Section 4 is
extended in order to allow an endogenous determination of the primary balance. The implications
in terms of debt dynamics are examined and sensitivity-analysis exercises are used to pinpoint
some important policy issues. Section 7 presents some concluding remarks.8
2. TRADITIONAL FISCAL POLICY INDICATORS: HISTORICAL RETROSPECTIVE
3
No more than a glance at Figure 2.1 is needed to grasp the extent of the variations in fiscal
indicators observed since the mid-eighties in Brazil, as the country lived through a period of great
macroeconomic instability. Understanding the ups and downs of those indicators, in the wake of
five failed stabilization attempts and the Real Plan, is less interesting at this point than detecting
the bottom line fiscal-stance changes over the period.
4
Figure 2.1
Brazil - Fiscal Deficits and Interest Payments, 1985-1996
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Examining the evolution of the primary balance in Figure 2.1, one identifies three markedly
distinct periods.
5 The first one, from 1985 to 1989, is basically the Sarney Administration term,
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that followed the end of a two-decade long military regime. The second period, from 1990 to
1994, covers both the short-lived Collor Administration, that ended with the impeachment of the
President in September 1992, and the Franco Administration that launched the Real Plan in mid-
1994, six months before the end of the presidential term. The third period, 1995-96, corresponds
to the first half of the present Cardoso Administration.
In order to have a clearer picture of the evolution of the fiscal indicators over the whole time
span, Table 2.1 presents averages for each of those three periods, variations of the averages
between periods and decomposition of the variations. The primary deficit line in the lower part of
the table, shows that the average primary surplus increased from 0.6 percent of GDP in 1985-89,
to 3.1 percent in 1990-94, only to fall back to less than 0.1 percent of GDP in 1995-96.  The
federal government was responsible for 80 percent of the improvement in the public-sector
primary surplus between the first two periods, but for only 36 percent of the deterioration
observed between the last two periods. The remaining deterioration stemmed, in roughly equal
parts, from the accounts of states and municipalities, on one hand, and public enterprises, on the
other.
The table also shows that the reduction of the operational deficit between 1985-89 and 1990-94
reached almost 5.5 percent of GDP, and that more than half of the improvement came from falling
interest payments. Between 1990-94 and 1995-96, however, the operational deficit widened again
by 4.5 percent of the GDP. Only less than a third of that variation may be attributed to the rising
public-sector interest bill. All the rest came from the vanishing primary surplus.
A closer and more careful analysis of the evolution of the primary balance is therefore a key step
towards a deeper understanding of the fiscal-policy performance in Brazil since the late eighties.
The next section will concentrate precisely on this point.10
Table 2. 1
Brazil: Changing Fiscal Deficits, 1985-1996
Annual Averages Variation 85/89 - 90/94 Variation 90/94 - 95/96 Variation 85/89 - 95/96
(In Percent of GDP)
Deficits Categories and 1985-1989 1990-1994 1995-1996 (B) - (A) Decomp I Decomp II (C) - (B) Decomp I Decomp II (C) - (A) Decomp I Decomp II
Public Sector Segments (A) (B) (C)
Operational Deficit 5,42 -0,05 4,45 -5,47 100,0 4,50 100,0 -0,97 100,0
      Federal Government 2,89 -0,54 1,72 -3,43 62,7 2,26 50,3 -1,17 119,9
      States and Municipalities 0,92 0,16 2,17 -0,75 13,8 2,01 44,8 1,26 -129,3
      Public Enterprises 1,62 0,33 0,62 -1,29 23,6 0,28 6,3 -1,01 103,3
Interest Payments 6,04 3,06 4,53 -2,99 54,6 100,0 1,47 32,7 100,0 -1,52 155,8 100,0
      Federal Government 2,45 1,01 2,16 -1,44 26,3 48,2 1,15 25,5 78,0 -0,29 29,9 19,2
      States and Municipalities 0,96 0,79 1,80 -0,16 3,0 5,5 1,00 22,3 68,3 0,84 -86,3 -55,4
      Public Enterprises 2,64 1,24 0,62 -1,40 25,7 47,0 -0,62 -13,7 -41,9 -2,02 207,5 133,2
Primary Deficit -0,62 -3,11 -0,08 -2,49 45,4 100,0 3,02 67,2 100,0 0,54 -55,3 100,0
      Federal Government 0,44 -1,55 -0,45 -1,99 36,4 80,1 1,10 24,5 36,4 -0,89 91,5 -165,5
      States and Municipalities -0,04 -0,63 0,37 -0,59 10,8 23,7 1,00 22,3 33,2 0,41 -42,5 76,9
      Public Enterprises -1,02 -0,91 -0,01 0,11 -2,1 -4,6 0,90 20,0 29,7 1,01 -104,2 188,611
3.  ALTERNATIVE FISCAL POLICY INDICATORS
During most of the period under analysis, the Brazilian economy was subject to very high inflation
rates and to an uneven GDP growth performance (see Figures 3.1 and 3.2). It is well known that
fluctuations in these  variables impact public sector’s tax revenues and expenditures, having
important effects on the observed changes in the fiscal deficit in any given year.
6 In order to
produce a more accurate picture of the underlying fiscal trends in the Brazilian economy in the
recent period, this section develops alternative indicators of fiscal policy. These indicators correct
conventional measures for the effects of the economic cycle, and yield an estimate of the changes
in the discretionary component of fiscal policy in each year. The section starts by deriving a
measure of the “fiscal impulse”
  7 for the Brazilian economy, then presents an estimate of the
“underlying” (or macroeconomic adjusted) primary deficit and concludes with a reassessment of
fiscal policy episodes examined in Section 2.
3.1  A Fiscal Impulse Measure
The change in the observed primary deficit with respect to the previous year, as a percentage of
GDP, is the simplest possible measure of the discretionary change in the budgetary position of the
public sector, or the “fiscal impulse”. Since it excludes interest payments, it captures only the
effects of contemporaneous fiscal policy actions. Its main disadvantage, however, is that part of
the observed fluctuations in the primary deficit are induced by the effects of the economic cycle
on tax revenues and expenditures and not by discretionary policy actions.
Blanchard (1990) suggests a measure of the fiscal impulse which addresses the main shortcoming
of the changes in the primary deficit without compromising its simplicity: the value of the primary
deficit in any given year if the unemployment rate had remained the same as in the previous year,
minus the primary deficit in the previous year. The measure, therefore, captures the change in the
primary deficit which cannot be attributed to the economic cycle, as measured by variations in the
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unemployment rate. Its estimation requires, in addition to the observed primary deficit, the
calculation of an adjusted primary deficit series.
In this paper an alternative version of Blanchard’s fiscal impulse measure is constructed  in which
the different components of the primary deficit are adjusted for variations both in the activity level
and the inflation rate.
8 It focus on output rather than unemployment because the former captures
better the short-run variations in the economic cycle in Brazil. Also, it adjusts the deficit for
changes in the inflation rate because of the asymmetric indexation of revenues and expenditures
throughout the period under analysis. While Brazilian tax revenues have been highly, though
imperfectly, indexed to the inflation rate for many years, expenditures were never subject to a
similar degree of indexation and used to have their real value significantly eroded during the high
inflation period.
 9
As the 1988 Constitution introduced changes that altered substantially the fiscal regime in Brazil,
the empirical work was based on data for the period of 1989 to 1996. Since this is a relatively
short time interval, quarterly data was used for the econometric estimations. Because there were
huge variations in the inflation rate during the period, all the data were collected on a monthly
basis and deflated and then converted to quarterly figures.
Except for the state value-added tax (ICMS), only federal government data is available on a
quarterly basis. Therefore, the estimated fiscal impulse measure reflects mainly the effect of
adjustments in federal tax revenues and expenditures. Series of revenues from most taxes were
adjusted, proving to be sensitive only to variations in the activity level. The exceptions were the
import tax and the ICMS, which were also adjusted for changes in the inflation rate. On the
expenditure side, the only category that had to be adjusted was the government payroll, which
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proved sensitive to changes in the inflation rate.
10 The remaining expenditure series did not show
any significant relationship with the two macroeconomic variables.
11
The estimated coefficients from the regressions of tax revenues and expenditures on the activity
level and the inflation rate were used to calculate the primary deficit which would have prevailed
in a given year if these two variables were at the same values as in the previous year. Actual and
adjusted values for the nonfinancial public sector primary deficit are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1
Brazil: Actual and Adjusted Primary Deficit, 1989-1996
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Actual Deficit   1.0 -4.6 -2.8 -1.6 -2.2 -5.3 -0.3  0.1
Adjusted Deficit   2.7 -2.8 -3.6 -2.1 -2.1 -4.0  0.5  0.8
The fiscal impulse measure was then calculated by subtracting from the value of the adjusted
deficit in period t the actual primary deficit in period t-1. Table 3.2 presents the actual change in
the nonfinancial public sector primary deficit, along with the estimated fiscal impulse measure.
Table 3.2
Brazil: Actual Change in the Primary Deficit and Fiscal Impulse Measure, 1989-1996
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Change in Deficit   0.9 -5.6  1.8   1.2 -0.6 -3.0  5.0  0.4
Fiscal Impulse Measure   2.6 -3.8  1.0   0.7 -0.5 -1.8  5.8  1.0
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3.2 The Underlying Deficit
The fiscal impulse measure from the previous section was constructed with the use of a primary
deficit series adjusted for changes in macroeconomic variables with respect to levels observed in
the preceding year. An alternative way of assessing discretionary changes in fiscal policy is
through the use of long-run equilibrium values for the macroeconomic variables as benchmarks to
generate the adjusted deficit series. By comparing this underlying (or macroeconomic adjusted)
deficit with the actual deficit, one can estimate the extent to which the observed policy stance
deviates from the levels that would prevail if the main macroeconomic determinants of the deficit
were at their long-run trend values.
In this paper an underlying primary deficit is constructed in which the tax revenue elasticities
employed above in the estimation of the fiscal impulse measure are used to calculate the primary
deficit which would have prevailed in a given year if the activity level were at its trend value.
12
Table 3.3 shows the actual nonfinancial public sector primary deficit, along with the estimated
underlying primary deficit.
Table 3.3
Brazil: Actual and Underlying Primary Deficit, 1989-1996
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Actual Deficit   1.0 -4.6 -2.8 -1.6 -2.2 -5.3 -0.3  0.1
Underlying Deficit   2.7 -4.3 -3.8 -1.8 -1.8 -4.7  0.2  0.6
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3.3  A Reassessment of Past Fiscal Policy Episodes
To what extent would the above derived indicators affect the assessment of past fiscal policy
episodes presented in Section 2? Both the adjusted and the underlying deficits show, on average,
a more expansionist fiscal policy stance than the actual deficit during the period 1989-1996.
13
Average values, of course, conceal important differences within the period. While the adjusted
and underlying deficit series indicate higher deficits or lower surpluses when compared to the
observed values for 1989-90 and 1994-96, they also show that the actual deficit significantly
underestimates the primary balances of 1991-92. For 1993, there is no significant  difference
between the actual and the adjusted deficits, but the underlying deficit shows a surplus lower than
the value that was in fact observed. This was an year in which there was a high rate of real GDP
growth and a significant increase in the inflation rate with respect to the previous year, causing the
effects on revenues and expenditures to cancel out in the construction of the adjusted deficit. As
for the underlying deficit, just the first effect is captured since the adjustment occurs only with
respect to the activity level (see Tables 3.1 and 3.3, and Figures 3.3 and 3.4).
The same kind of conclusion emerges from the analysis of Table 3.2, which shows an average
fiscal impulse of 0.6 percent of GDP for 1989-96, as opposed to the neutral fiscal policy stance
suggested by the average change in the actual primary deficit during the same period.
Again, period averages conceal important differences in single years. The estimated fiscal impulse
measure for 1989, for example, shows a much more expansionist stance than the actual change in
the primary deficit suggests. While the actual deficit increased by about 0.9 percent of GDP with
respect to the previous year, the estimated fiscal impulse measure was virtually three times bigger.
That difference could probably be explained by the high rate of real GDP growth and the
substantial acceleration of inflation in 1989. Similarly, for 1990 the estimated fiscal
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impulse measure shows a less contractionist fiscal policy than the actual change in the deficit does.
This result, however, should possibly be attributed to the temporary increase in the tax burden in18
the context of the first Collor Plan, rather than to effects of the economic cycle on tax revenues
and expenditures series (see Table 3.2 and Figure 3.5).
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Figure 3.5
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For both 1991 and 1992 the changes in the actual deficit show a more expansionist policy stance
than the estimated fiscal impulse measure suggests. This is particularly the case of 1991, when the
change in the observed deficit is almost twice the estimated fiscal impulse measure. The difference
can be explained by the effect on tax revenues of the virtual stagnation in real GDP during these
two years. This effect more than compensated the impact on expenditures of the acceleration in
the inflation rate following the breakdown of the second Collor Plan in mid 1991.
The two indicators are significantly different again during the period that followed the launching
of the Real Plan. The fiscal impulse data presented in Table 3.2 show that the change in the
observed deficit overestimates the fiscal contraction of 1994, and underestimates the fiscal
expansion of 1995-96. In fact, when measured by the estimated fiscal impulse the contraction in
1994 was less than two thirds of the change in the observed deficit. That can be explained by the
                                               
14 Adjusted revenues are lower than actual revenues in 1990, despite the sharp contraction in real GDP observed in
that year  (See Appendix 2).19
record rate of real GDP growth of 6 percent during the year, which increased tax collection by
more than 2 percentage points of GDP with respect to 1993. The impact of GDP growth on
adjusted revenues more than compensated the fact that adjusted expenditures were lower than
actual expenditures because of the sharp drop in the inflation rate during 1994.
Finally, for 1995-96 the estimated measure shows that the fiscal stance deterioration was larger
than suggested by the conventional indicator.
15 While the observed deficit showed a cumulative
increase of 5.4 percent of GDP, the estimated fiscal impulse in these two years reached about 6.8
percent of GDP. In both years, the difference between the two indicators can be explained by the
fact that adjusted revenues were systematically lower than actual revenues. Again, this effect more
than compensated the fact that adjusted expenditures were lower than actual expenditures.
What are the implications of the above trends for the sustainability of fiscal policy in Brazil? As
the next sections will show, the present fiscal stance is hardly sustainable. Unless very favorable
assumptions are made, current tax rules and spending programs will cause the public debt to GDP
ratio to grow very rapidly in the near future.
                                               
15 In fact, the quarterly data presented in Figure A2.10 in Appendix 2 show that the deterioration in the fiscal
policy stance started in the last quarter of 1994.20
4.  DEBT DYNAMICS
The understanding of the determinants of public-sector debt dynamics is a key step towards a
fuller assessment of fiscal sustainability in the Brazilian economy. After a discussion of the
consequences of the current macroeconomic policy mix, this section calls attention to specificities
of the Brazilian debt dynamics process and resorts to a simulation model to envisage the
implications of different fiscal policy scenarios.
4.1  Policy Mix and the Public-Sector Net Debt
For many years, macroeconomic policy in Brazil has been marked by a combination of lax fiscal
policy and high interest rates. During the long high-inflation experience of the eighties and early
nineties, extremely high interest rates were used to curb currency substitution and to keep outright
hyperinflation at bay.
16 But not even the successful stabilization plan of 1994 managed to reduce
the asymmetry of the macroeconomic policy mix. As shown in Figure 4.1 below, the demand
boom that followed the launching of the stabilization plan in mid-1994 could only be choked by
soaring interest rates, given the sharp fiscal deterioration of 1995, already analyzed in Sections 2
and 3 above. Though interest rates have been brought down steadily since the last quarter of
1995, the basic rate was still above 20% by the end of 1996. The medium- to long-run
consequences of that kind of asymmetrical policy mix are very well known. For the purposes of
the present section, the important ones are those related to the perverse implications for the
dynamics of the public sector debt.
As shown in Table 4.1, the public-sector net debt has increased from 28.5 percent of  GDP in
December 1994 to 34.4 per cent in December 1996. More than two thirds of that increase
stemmed from the net debt of the federal government and the Central Bank, as may be observed
                                               
16 See Carneiro and Garcia (1994).21
 Figure 4.1 
Brazil: Annualized Basic Real Interest Rate (Monthly Average)


































































































Brazil, Non-Financial Public-Sector Net Debt, 1994-1996













(1) Federal Government & Central Bank Net Debt 12.3 13.0 16.4 4.1
Gross Debt 31.4 32.8 39.1 7.7
     Domestic Debt 18.1 22.0 29.8 11.7
     Foreign Debt 13.3 10.8 9.3 -4.0
(-) Foreign Reserves 7.2 7.4 7.7 0.5
(-) Other Assets 11.9 12.4 15.1 3.2
(2) State and Municipal Governments Net Debt 9.5 10.4 11.9 2.4
Domestic Net Debt 9.2 10.1 11.6 2.4
Foreign Net Debt 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.1
(3) Public Enterprises Net Debt 6.7 6.5 6.1 -0.6
Domestic Net Debt 4.8 4.8 4.0 -0.8
Foreign Net Debt 1.9 1.7 2.0 -0.1
Public-Sector Net Debt  [(1) + (2) + (3)]
28.5 29.9 34.4 5.9
Source: Banco Central do Brasil22
in the last column of the table. The evolution of federal net-debt figures should be seen with a
grain of salt. Though the federal net debt has really increased much less dramatically than the
federal gross debt since 1994, the slower increase conceals a deterioration of the quality of the
net-debt that deserves some attention.
High interest rates have had a severe impact on the accounts of state and municipal governments.
And the combination of high interest rates and the sudden end of the high-inflation regime
precipitated the already expected going under of the most fragile part of the banking system,
largely constituted by banks controlled by the states. In order to avoid a major banking crisis, the
Central Bank launched in late 1995 a program to bail out large banks which were facing problems.
At least three big private institutions had been rescued by April 1997, roughly in the same way:
the Central Bank assuming the bad part of the insolvent bank’s balance sheet and forcing the sale
of  the remaining part to a sounder institution, properly persuaded to participate in the operation
by the access to a low-interest credit line. Something similar is now being done with the insolvent
state banks, after a long political battle with governors that insisted in keeping control over their
banks after the bail out operation.
But, having lost that battle, state governors won a much more important one, as they managed to
extract from the federal government a generous restructuring of the states’ sizable outstanding
debt. As high-interest state bonds are being swapped for lower-interest federal bonds, the states’
debt is being largely converted into debt to the federal government and, therefore, being
subtracted from the federal gross debt in the net-debt figures. Analogously, non-performing assets
of the insolvent banks transferred to the Central Bank, as well as low-interest loans extended to
the institutions that absorbed those banks, are also being deducted from the federal gross debt. As
the importance of those various assets has been growing very rapidly there is every reason to
believe that the quality of the federal net-debt figures is being negatively affected.
In fact, the last column of  Table 4.1 shows an increment of  11.7 percent of GDP in the gross
domestic debt of the federal government and the Central Bank, partly compensated by a reduction
in their foreign debt equivalent to 4  per cent of GDP. The resulting gross-debt increment of 7.723
per cent of GDP, though still impressive, led to a much smaller increase in the federal net debt,
largely because it was offset by an accumulation of “other assets” amounting to 3.2 per cent of
GDP.
4.2  “Skeletons in the Closet”, Privatization Proceeds and Seigniorage
Besides the macroeconomic policy mix, at least three other factors are bound to be important
determinants of the public-sector debt dynamics. The first has to do with the existence of
contingent and hidden liabilities that are either expected in some sense or simply pop up
unexpectedly. When liabilities of that sort appear, as skeletons taken out of the closet, they
become normal registered debt.
In Brazil, the most important of those liabilities stems from the federal guarantee granted to the
Mortgage Assistance Fund (Fundo de Compensação de Variações Salariais, FCVS), administered by
the Federal Savings Bank (Caixa Econômica Federal, CEF).
17  The FCVS was originally designed to
stimulate the housing industry by providing insurance to the financial institutions against loss of income
by borrowers.  Preliminary estimates point to an accumulated deficit of US$ 40 billion for the FCVS,
which eventually will have to be assumed by the federal government.
18
Another liability of that kind stems from the inability of the federal government to collect certain
debts that are being considered as assets in its balance sheet. It is highly probable that, in the
future, part of the assets which are being subtracted from the federal gross public debt, as just
discussed above, may prove to be partially or totally worthless. The states may not fully honor
part of their debts to the federal government, or some of the assets transferred to the Central
Bank when failing banks were bailed out may prove to be worthless.  If and when that happens,
the federal net-debt figures will have to be adjusted upwards. Therefore, the writing off of those
assets in the federal government balance sheet may well be treated as equivalent to a contingent
                                               
17 See Furuguem et alii (1996).24
liability. The still hidden costs of the bailing out of the failing banks and the restructuring of the
states’ debt are bound to comprise an important part of the “skeletons in the closet”.
Another important determinant of the public-sector debt dynamics is the flow of privatization
proceeds. Though there have been many important public assets sales, particularly since 1991,
only very recently cash payments have become relevant. The first wave of privatization involved
auctions in which various kinds of public debt were accepted as payment. Also, most of the
enterprises transferred to the private sector belonged to manufacturing industries, with a large
part of the assets sales concentrated in the steel and chemical sectors. Since 1994, however, the
privatization program has reached a new stage. As the divestiture in the manufacturing industries
advanced, the federal government prepared public enterprises in other sectors to be privatized,
and started to require cash payments. Three electricity supply companies and CVRD, the big
mining concern, have already been privatized. The bulk of the state-owned electricity supply
industry and the whole telecommunications industry are now in line to be privatized over the next
few years. A sizable part of the privatization of the electricity industry will also involve the sale of
assets that belong to the states. Privatization proceeds are expected to reach a peak in 1998 and
as much as US$ 80 billion over the period 1997-2002.
The effect of privatization on public-sector debt dynamics will depend, not so much on the flow of
privatization proceeds, but on the part of that flow effectively channeled into debt redemption.
Though the present government appeared for quite a long time totally committed to using all
funds generated by the privatization program to redeem public debt, the commitment seems to
have been mollified since the assets sales operations started to involve cash payments. The
President has been strongly pressed to spend the new resources in various ways. In early 1997,
after some strife within the government over how the resources generated by the sale of CVRD
should be used, the President “solomonically” decided that half would be used to redeem debt and
the other half to fund low-interest long-term loans to the private sector. However, in July 1997, in
                                                                                                                                                      
18 One could also include among such liabilities those that are being accumulated in the wake of new entitlements
generated by the social security system, though they could also be treated in a different way, as part of the expected
future expenditure flows of the public sector, as will be done in Section 6 below.25
the wake of the growing concern with the consequences of the crisis that swept across Southeast
Asian economies, the Government decided that it was time to show a stronger committment to
fiscal rectitude and announced that the proceeds would be “obsessively allocated” to the
redemption of public debt.
Finally, a third important determinant of the public-sector debt dynamics is the extent of  the
financing that could stem from seigniorage. The Brazilian economy emerged from its very long
high-inflation experience with an extremely low monetization ratio. As the monthly inflation rate
was sharply brought down in mid-1994, from 50 per cent to something around one per cent, a
strong remonetization movement was expected. However, the response of the demand for money
has been much less intense than anticipated. Almost three years after the launching of the
stabilization program, the monetary base is still limited to about 2.8 per cent of GDP. If the
monetization ratio remains at such a low mark in the future, the contribution of seigniorage to
public-deficit financing is bound to be extremely limited.
19
4.3  Simulating Debt Dynamics
The analysis of the dynamics of the public sector debt may be separated into two parts. The first
one involves the determinants of the evolution of the primary balance. Given the path of the
primary balance over time, one may then examine how the debt stock variables are bound to
evolve. The simulation analysis of this section will be confined to exercises based on exogenous
scenarios for the primary balance path. In Section 6, other exercises, based on a more complete
version of the simulation model, will reexamine the dynamics of public-sector debt, using
endogenously generated primary balance paths.
The main features of the simulation model used in this section may be described as follows.
20
Given the rapid advancement of the privatization process and the extensive ongoing restructuring
                                               
19 See Pastore and Pinotti (1997).
20 A detailed description of the simulation model may be found in Appendix 3.26
of state and municipal debts -- which are being transformed into obligations to the federal
government, as just seen above --, the aggregate public-sector debt is actually in a state of flux. It
was therefore considered unwise to break it down into the traditional three debt stocks: federal,
state & municipal and public enterprises’. Instead, the aggregate public-sector net-debt was
separated in the model into local-currency denominated registered net-debt (BR), foreign-
currency denominated registered net-debt (BRD) and external net-debt (D). Interest rates on the
various debt-stocks are all referred to an exogenous external rate. The highest spread (s) is paid
on BR. Given the covered exchange-rate risk, a smaller spread is paid on BRD. A fixed spread is
paid on D, since the current cost of the external net-debt is highly dominated by the cost of Brady
bonds and the return on the stock of foreign reserves.
The base year is 1996 and the simulation period extends to 2002, the final year of the next
presidential term. Given an exogenous path for the primary balance of the public sector (dp), the
model determines the volume of interest payments (INT) and the operational balance (dop) for the
first year. The debt stocks in the first year are then determined, taking into account the
operational balance as well as three other factors: the expected volume of public assets sales from
privatization (AS), the possible emergence of contingent and hidden liabilities (HD) and the
importance of seigniorage. The resulting change in indebtedness is distributed in fixed proportions
between BR and BRD. Having obtained the value of the debt stocks for the first year, the model
repeats the exercise for the second year and so forth.
As the dynamics of the public-sector debt depends to a great extent upon the evolution of interest
rates over time, special care was dedicated to the determination of the interest spread variable (s).
The idea was to assure that, in each scenario, the evolution of the interest spread would be fairly
consistent with the primary balance path. Though its reasonable to assume that a sounder fiscal
stance, as measured by the primary balance, should allow lower interest rates, the actual extent of
the response of interest rates to an improvement in the fiscal accounts is certainly open to dispute.
But that is no reason to avoid a systematic treatment of the problem. So, just in order to impose
consistency between the primary balance and the interest spread, the model simply determines the
interest spread (s) as an isoelastic function of the primary balance. The  sensitiveness of the27
simulation results to different views on the probable response of interest rates to an improvement
in fiscal stance may therefore be explored by simply changing the value of a parameter.
Three different scenarios were considered, their differences being the assumptions about the
evolution of the primary balance over the simulation period. In the first scenario, there is no fiscal
adjustment whatsoever. The zero primary balance observed in 1996 is repeated year after year till
2002. The second scenario has the primary balance improving slowly, though steadily, over the
simulation period, reaching 2 percent of GDP in 2002. Finally, in the third scenario, the primary
balance jumps to 1.5 per cent of GDP in 1997 and stays at this level till the end of the period
under consideration. As shown in Table 4.2, the same set of assumptions about the evolution of
public assets sales, emergence of contingent and hidden liabilities and external interest rate was
adopted in all three scenarios. Also invariant were the assumptions about inflation, exchange-rate
policy and growth performance during the period. Though this uniformity may certainly have
made some of the scenarios less consistent than they could have been, it assured a clearer
interpretation of the simulation results. Besides, these simulations can be easily complemented by
other exercises to check the sensitivity of the obtained conclusions to refinements in some of the
assumptions.
Simulation results are presented in a set of graphs in Figure 4.2. The first graph, on the top left,
serves as a reminder of the basic differences among the three scenarios: the assumptions about the
evolution of the primary balance over the period. In Scenario 1, in which a no-improvement path
is envisaged, the public-sector net debt, shown on the lower right graph, jumps from 34.4 percent
of GDP in 1996 to 50 percent in 2002. Scenario 3, that assumes an effort that leads to a primary
surplus of 1.5 percent of GDP in 1997, which is maintained over the rest of the period, tells a
totally different story. The public-sector net debt as a proportion of GDP would rise in 1997 and
start to fall from 1998 on, reaching 32.2 percent of GDP in 2002, somewhat below the base year
mark. Scenario 2, represents a halfway case, in which the primary balance describes a slow,
though steady, upward movement over the period, reaching 2 percent of GDP in 2002. The net
debt would be rising till 2001 but would fall back slightly to 36.2 percent of GDP in 2002.Table 4.2






















1997 2.0 1.0 4.0 6.0 8.0 5.9
1998 2.5 1.0 4.5 5.5 8.0 6.1
1999 1.5 1.0 4.5 5.0 7.5 6.1
2000 1.0 1.0 4.5 4.5 6.5 6.1
2001 1.0 1.0 4.5 4.0 6.0 6.1
2002 1.0 1.0 4.5 4.0 5.5 6.1
It should be noticed that the zero primary-balance path assumed in Scenario 1 leads to a such a
strong increase in the net-debt as a proportion of GDP -- despite the vigorous flow of
privatization proceeds --, partly because the precarious fiscal situation prevents the interest rate
from falling, in contrast to what happens in the other two scenarios, as may be seen in the top
right graph of Figure 4.2. The widely different consequences for the evolution of both the volume
of real interest payments and the operational balance are shown in the two graphs in the mid-row
of the figure. On the other hand, the debt dynamics depicted in Scenario 1, worrying as it certainly
is, may actually be underestimating the rise of indebtedness that would result from a zero primary-
balance path over the period. In fact, as stressed above, the invariant set of assumptions described
in table 4.2 and adopted in the three scenarios, helped to provide a controlled experiment, but at
the cost of compromising the consistency and plausibility of some of  the scenarios. It is highly
implausible that the macroeconomic policy mix of Scenario 1 could be consistent with the
common assumption adopted for GDP growth over the period. More likely, such a policy mix
would at best be consistent with a much lower average GDP growth rate from 1997 to 2002. And
that would mean an even faster increase in the public-sector net debt as a proportion of GDP.Chart 4.2
Brazil: 1997-2002
Results of the Simulation Exercises: Three Scenarios








1996 1998 2000 2002
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Public-Sector Primary Balance 









1996 1998 2000 2002
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Public-Sector Real Interest Payments







1996 1998 2000 2002
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Public-Sector Operational Balance






1996 1998 2000 2002
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Public-Sector Net Debt, excl. Monetary Base








1996 1998 2000 2002
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3
Public-Sector Net Debt








1996 1998 2000 2002
Scenario 1 Scenario 2 Scenario 3If, for example, one assumes -- optimistically, under the circumstances of  Scenario 1 -- that the
GDP growth rate will remains at 3 per cent per year during the whole period, the public-sector
net debt in 2002 jumps, not to 50 percent of GDP, as seen above,  but to 54.2 percent of GDP.
Another important point to be noticed is that the simulations assume in all three scenarios that 
3/4
of the total proceeds from privatization are used to redeem debt. The underlying assumptions are
that federal assets-sales proceeds -- comprising 75 percent of the total expected privatization
proceeds -- will be entirely set side for debt redemption, but that, in contrast, the remaining 25
percent, that should accrue to state governments, will be wholly used to fund additional
expenditures. What would happen if, instead, only half of the federal proceeds could be set aside
for debt redemption, in line with the policy the Government was tempted to adopt till mid-1997.
That would bring down the the fraction of total privatization proceeds used to redeem debt from
3/4 to 
3/8. In Scenario 1, for example, that change would make the public-sector net debt to reach
54.2 percent of GDP in 2002, under the GDP growth assumptions of Table 4.2, and to 58.6
percent of GDP, under the more realistic growth assumptions adopted in the last paragraph.
The possible evolution of the interest rate over the period deserves a closer look. As was seen
above, in order to impose consistency between the primary balance and the interest rate, the
simulation model assumes the interest spread (s) to be an  isoelastic function of the primary
balance. In all simulations considered so far the elasticity (a) of that function was presumed to be
equal to 
1/2. What would be the sensitivity of the simulation results to changes in the value of that
parameter? Figure 4.3 presents results of simulations for Scenario 3 -- which assumes the most
favorable primary-balance path -- for different values of a. Besides 
1/2,  two other values, 
1/4 and
2/3, are also considered. The faster fall in interest rates implied by the latter value would lead to a
public-sector net debt in 2002 of 30.9 percent of GDP, instead of 32.2 percent, obtained when the
value attributed to a was 
1/2. If, on the other hand, the parameter is set equal to 
2/3, the end-year
net debt would reach 35.3 percent of GDP.31
FIGURE 4.3
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A final observation concerns the sensitivity of the results to the assumption on the evolution of the
external interest rate. If the rates assumed in Table 4.2 are adjusted upward by one percentage
point, the public-sector net debt of 2002 increases by 2.1 percent GDP in Scenario 1 and between
1.8 and 1.9 percent of GDP in the other two scenarios. That might serve as a rough proxy of the
degree of vulnerability of the fiscal accounts to a rise in external interest rates.
4.4  Plausibility of the Assumptions on the Evolution of the Primary-balance
The simulation exercises discussed in the present section were based on scenarios that assumed
exogenous primary-balance paths. Though that proved to be a convenient way to concentrate the
focus of the analysis on the debt-dynamics process and to explore the relative importance of its
main determinants, important questions were left unanswered. How plausible are the assumptions
on the primary-balance path adopted in those scenarios? What is the likely evolution of the
primary balance over the coming years after all? Those are the main questions addressed in the
next two sections.33
5.  PRIMARY BALANCE: RIGIDITIES AND STRUCTURAL TRENDS
The possibilities for improvement in the public sector primary balance in the coming years are
constrained by severe rigidities and adverse structural trends. This section traces the core of those
difficulties to the constitutional reform of 1988 and analyzes the extent of the most serious
constraints.
5.1  Fiscal Consequences of the 1988 Constitution
A large part of the roots of the current fiscal problems in Brazil can be found in the difficulties
faced by the country during the redemocratization period, after the end of the military regime in
early 1985. Tancredo Neves, an able and influential politician who had been elected the first
president of the civilian regime by an impressive coalition, died before taking office, opening the
way to a considerably less endowed and less influential vice-president. During the first three years
of his Administration, the Congress drafted the new Constitution, which was finally promulgated
in late 1988. Unfortunately, the long and delicate negotiations which brought about the new
Constitution took place exactly when the federal government was notably weak, due to the
shortcomings of a president accidentally inducted into office, and continuously mobilized by the
quest for a higher degree of legitimacy. Therefore, the interests that should have been defended by
the central government were not properly taken into consideration.
In fact, the federal government had become even weaker after the failure of two stabilization
attempts, in 1986 and 1987. As the complex political alliance behind Tancredo Neves could not
be maintained, a new coalition, strongly influenced by state and local governments, approved a
Constitution which redesigned the previous system of fiscal federalism. The central government
lost a substantial part of its tax revenue to state and local governments, without being able to
transfer to them any significant part of its spending programs. And as the new fiscal system was
phased in, state and local governments not only quickly adjusted their spending to their fast
growing revenue. They in fact started to spend well above their enlarged means. It was not only34
an inconsistent fiscal federalism arrangement that was established. As well put by  Bacha and
Lamounier (1992), “the abstractly desirable goal of decentralization prevailed over any
consideration of timing, further weakening the central government at a moment when the
Brazilian inflationary monster seemed again untamable” (p. 23).
In addition to introducing an inconsistent fiscal federalism arrangement, which amplified the
Union's burden in the required fiscal adjustment effort, the new Constitution did not  endow the
state which emerged from the long military period with "a coherent [...] machinery against the
multiple pressures of an emerging mass democracy, of a huge electorate [and] of a new generation
of independent and aggressive labor leaders"
21. In fact, it amplified the scope for the historical
rent-seeking behavior of many segments of the Brazilian society, imposing on the federal budget a
considerable additional burden, exactly when the Union's fiscal resources were being reduced.
Some of the most important components of that burden will be analyzed below.
5.1  Payroll Rigidities
The new Constitution brought a very high degree of rigidity to public sector payroll expenditures.
All public employees of federal, state and  local governments in official civil-servant careers were
granted lifetime job tenure. At the federal level, the establishment of a single civil-service code
resulted in the extension of all compensation privileges of the official civil-servant career to about
400 thousand employees, previously hired under the rules of private-sector working contracts.
22
The impact on the cost of retirement benefits was particularly important. In contrast to private-
sector employees, all public servants are now entitled to a retirement pay that is in general at least
equivalent to the value of the last paycheck before retirement. As seen in Figure 5.1, federal
payroll expenditures, which includes payments to both active and retired personnel,  almost
                                               
21 Bacha and Lamounier (1992, p. 26).
22 See Velloso (1996b).35
doubled as a proportion of GDP between 1987 and 1996. The retired-personnel payroll
component was more than trebled during the period.
Figure 5.1
Brazil: Federal Government Payroll Expenditures, 1987-1996
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Source: Ministério da Administração e da Reforma do Estado
Something similar happened with state and local governments that also had to adopt a unified
civil-service code. As the generalized option was to transfer all employees to the official career,
state and local governments became responsible for their retirement benefits without having made
any adequate provisions for that.  All state governments and more than one thousand local
governments offer special social security benefits to their employees. Most of those social-security
plans are notoriously generous and highly inconsistent from an actuarial perspective. All the evidence
available points to the mounting burden those benefits have been representing in the budgets of infra-
national governments.
23 As shown in Figure 5.2, in some of the most important states payroll
expenditures consumed more than 80 percent of the net revenue in 1995.
                                               
23 See Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social (1997) and Rigueira (1997).36
It is unlikely that the increase in payroll expenditures will be easily reverted in the near future, as
the possible erosion of real salaries by inflation has been much reduced in the wake of the very
success of the stabilization plan. In addition, expenditures with retired-personnel, especially in
state and local governments, are expected to show a very fast rate of growth in the near future.
The Cardoso Administration has been trying to extract from Congress
Source: Ministério da Administraçäo e Reforma do Estado
* Includes retired-personnel payroll
Figure 5.2
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constitutional amendments that could slowly reduce the rigidities of payroll expenditures at all
three government levels. However, strong vested interests in Congress conspire against such
amendments. The extent to which the Government will be able to back out without compromising
the idea of turning payroll expenditures considerably less rigid is not yet clear.
5.2  Social Security Benefits and Health Assistance Programs
“Redemption of the social debt” was a key expression during the drafting of the 1988
Constitution. In practice it meant putting the expansion of entitlement programs in a fast track.37
Social insurance benefits were significantly extended, an income-maintenance program for
unemployed workers was created and the right to free access to health care programs was
established.
The fiscal pressure coming from the present social security system in Brazil probably is the most
important aspect to be considered in the assessment of the budgetary consequences of structural
trends. As seen in Figure 5.3, federal expenditures with social security benefits doubled between
1987 and 1996.
 Such a substantial increase can largely be attributed to the effects of the 1988
Constitution. The unit values of all benefits were  revised, in order to restore their original values
in terms of minimum wages, and a floor of one minimum wage for all social insurance benefits
was established. In addition, 5 million retirement benefits in rural areas, earned by beneficiaries
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24 On the Brazilian social security system, see Oliveira and Beltrão (1995), and Além and Giambiagi (1997).38
As with personnel expenditures, it is unlikely that the recent increase in the expenditures with
social security benefits will be reduced in the near future. Since most of this increase resulted from
a higher quantum of benefits, the expenditures could only be reduced if there is a change in the
present set of rules concerning social security entitlements and contributions.
Another important source of rigidity has been the very fast expansion of expenditures with health
assistance programs in the wake of the universalization of entitlements imposed by the 1988
Constitution. The unlimited legal right to free health care has created a big open-ended
expenditure program and has put the installed health-care supply capacity under great strain.
Queuing and deplorable quality of the health care standards became inevitable. Worried with the
growing sensitivity of public opinion to the flow of bad news stemming from the health programs,
the federal government has been under constant pressure to increase the budgetary allocation of
those programs, despite mounting evidences of mismanagement of funds, especially in the
reimbursement of private institutions authorized to provide the demanded health-care services.
Given the limited possibility of increasing the tax revenue in a more commendable fashion, the
federal government has resorted to the earmarked revenue of newly imposed bad-quality turnover
taxes.
25
5.3  Limits to a Heavier Tax Burden and Sustainability of Fiscal Repression
With a gross tax burden in excess of 30 percent of GDP, Brazil occupies a clear outlying position
among countries with a similar stage of development. There seems to be little room for a further
significant increase in the tax burden as a fiscal adjustment measure, particularly when the country
will have to make every effort to become a more competitive economy. Besides, the quality of the
tax system has been negatively affected in the last few years, as the federal government tried --
with considerable success -- to recover the revenue loss imposed by the 1988 Constitution.
                                               
25 As the new CPMF, a provisional turnover tax on financial services that is expected to generate an annual
revenue of 0.8 percent of GDP earmarked to the financing of health programs.39
Facing the need to make a permanent fiscal adjustment, the central government has been
constrained by the obligation to transfer to lower level governments a large proportion of the
revenue stemming from the personal income tax, profit tax and excise taxes on industrialized
products, knowing in advance that any transfer will be immediately spent by state and local
governments. That has created a search for exotic federal taxes, capable of generating resources
not shared with lower level governments. And that has brought about a serious deterioration in
the quality of the tax system. Also, recurrent piece-meal changes in the tax policy and a sine die
postponement of a comprehensive tax reform have contributed to turn the tax system much more
complex than it probably could be.
If there is so little hope of a sizable relief from the revenue side, there are also strong reasons to
believe that keeping expenditures under control will have to depend less and less on the
application of simple fiscal repression measures, that are bound to become untenable after being
extensively used for so many years. There is ample evidence that the political costs of recurrent
fiscal repression are in fact contributing to erode the already precarious political coalition that
seems to support a major fiscal adjustment effort in the country. Therefore, structural reforms that
could really change the nature of the present fiscal regime have become even more urgent than a
few years ago, notwithstanding the present widespread skepticism about the political feasibility of
implementing reforms of such breadth in the very near future.
As will be seen in the next section, even under reasonably optimistic assumptions on the possible
evolution of the determinants of the primary balance, in scenarios that do not contemplate a major
fiscal reform, the public-sector debt is bound to show a rapid increase over the period under
analysis.40
6.  DEBT DYNAMICS WITH ENDOGENOUS PRIMARY-BALANCE PATHS
In this section, the simulation model used in Section 4 is extended in order to allow an
endogenous determination of the primary balance. Results of simulation exercises based on a set
of three different scenarios -- now also involving assumptions about key determinants of the
primary balance -- are discussed. Their implications in terms of debt dynamics are then examined
and sensitivity-analysis exercises used to pinpoint some important fiscal-adjustment policy issues.
6.1  Simulating the Evolution of the Primary Balance
The determination of the primary balance in the model may be briefly described as follows.
26 The
public sector is divided into the three traditional segments: federal government (which includes
the Central Bank), state & municipal governments and public enterprises. But attention is
concentrated on the first two segments. The public-enterprises primary balance is kept as an
exogenous variable.
27
The primary balance of the federal government (dF) is the difference between its net tax revenue
(which excludes transfers to state and municipal governments) and its non-interest expenditures.
The later are broken into active-personnel payroll (w), retired personnel payroll (wr), social
security benefits (ssb), health-programs (he), investment (ie) and other expenditures (oe). The
primary balance of state and municipal governments (dSM) has expenditures disaggregated into
payroll (wSM), purchases of goods and services (gs), investment (ieSM), and other expenditures
(oeSM). Revenues are divided into transfers from the federal government, state value-added tax
revenue (svat) and other tax revenue (ot).
                                               
26 A detailed presentation of the model may be found in Appendix 3.
27 As privatization is pushed forward over the next few years, the relative weight of public enterprises in the public
sector as a whole is bound to be considerably reduced. On the other hand, the enterprises that are likely to remain
public will tend to be the less profitable ones, with the prominent exception of Petrobrás, if it is really kept out the
privatization program after all. Most of them -- Petrobrás included -- will be under pressure to carry on much
needed investment programs rather than to be a source of fiscal relief. Having all that in mind, the primary balance
of public enterprises was not determined endogenously in the model. In all exercises below, that balance was
assumed to reach 0.4 percent of GDP (i.e. surplus) in 1997 and to fall linearly over the period 1998-2000 till it
reaches zero in 2001-2002, the final years of the simulation period. For an attempt to model public enterprises’
accounts in Brazil, when they had more weight in the public sector, see Werneck (1988).41
When assumptions on the parameters governing the evolution of those expenditures and revenues
are made, the model generates the public-sector primary balance path. Again, three different
scenarios were considered. The differences stem from values attributed to a set of parameters
identified as having a key role in the determination of the public-sector expenditures. Assumptions
concerning the evolution of the revenues of all levels of government were kept invariant across
the three scenarios. Attention was concentrated on the behavior of payroll expenditures (w, wR,
and wSM), social-security benefits (ssb) and  health-programs expenditures (he).
Nominal changes in the value of any one of those expenditures may be usefully decomposed into
changes in quantum and in price. Payroll expenditures, for example, may continue to grow even
when public-employees salaries are frozen, on account of either a rising number of employees or,
more likely, simple wage drift, i.e., an increase in the average salary stemming, for instance, from
automatic time-of-service promotion rules. This component of the change in payroll expenditures
will be labeled change in quantum, as opposed to the price change that stems from the simple
across-the-board readjustment of public employees’ salaries. As the same kind of reasoning may
be used for other expenditures as well, the simulation model allows separate assumptions on
relevant quanta and prices to be made.
It is assumed, in all three scenarios, that salaries of public employees in all three levels of
government are readjusted yearly according to the inflation rate.  The annual readjustment of the
minimum wage -- that determines the value of social security benefits -- is also assumed to strictly
follow the inflation rate in Scenario A, but to be somewhat above inflation in the other two
scenarios: half percentage point in B and one percentage point in C. The remaining differences
among the three scenarios concern assumptions on the quantum growth rates of payroll
expenditures, social security benefits and health expenditures.  The quantum of payroll
expenditures of state and municipal governments (which includes a swelling retired-personnel
component) is assumed to show a 2 percent annual growth rate in Scenario A, against 3 percent
in B and 4 percent in C. At the federal level, the quantum of the active-personnel payroll is
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assumed to expand by half percent per year in Scenario A, 1.0 percent in B and 1.5 percent in C.
And the federal retired-personnel payroll by 2 percent in Scenario A, 3 percent in B and 4 percent
in C. As for the quantum of social security benefits, the growth rates considered in the three
scenarios were taken from a recently published prospective study on social-security
expenditures.
28 Different assumptions on the real value of health programs expenditures were also
made. In Scenario A, the elasticity of that value with respect to real GDP was assumed to be
equal to 1.0, in Scenario B, to 1.25 and in Scenario C to 1.5. All three scenarios maintained the
same common set of assumptions -- listed in Table 4.2 above -- used in the simulation exercises
analyzed in Section 4. The main differences among the scenarios that are now being considered
are therefore those that are summarized in Table 6.1.
Results of the simulations for the three scenarios are presented in a set of graphs in Figure 6.1.
The top left graph shows the public-sector primary balance paths. In scenario A, the improving
primary balance resembles the exogenously assumed path of Scenario 2, considered in Section 4.
But the improvement seems a bit less strong, the primary surplus reaching only 1.6 percent of
GDP in 2002. Roughly half of that improvement stems from the federal accounts and the other
half from state and municipal governments, as may be seen in other two graphs in the upper part
of Figure 6.1. In scenario B, the primary balance path shows a much slower upward movement. In
2002, the primary surplus is only half percent of GDP. Finally, the primary-balance path of
Scenario C seems to be even worse than the one exogenously assumed in Scenario 1 of Section 4.
Instead of a no-improving primary balance, one now gets a slowly worsening one, with the
primary deficit reaching 0.8 percent of GDP in 2002.
The evolution of payroll expenditures and expenditures with social-security benefits and health
programs are also shown in the same set of graphs of Figure 6.1. Total federal payroll
expenditures slide down as a proportion of GDP in all three scenarios, shrinking over the period
                                               
28 See Além and Giambiaggi (1997), p. 20.Table 6.1
Determinants of the Evolution of the Primary Balance: Three Scenarios






















Parameters wm n nR nSM x h
Scenario 1
1997 6.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 3.9 4.0
1998 5.5 0.5 2.0 2.0 4.1 4.5
1999 5.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 4.3 4.5
2000 4.5 0.5 2.0 2.0 4.5 4.5
2001 4.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 4.7 4.5
2002 4.0 0.5 2.0 2.0 4.8 4.5
Scenario 2
1997 6.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 4.8 5.0
1998 6.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 5.1 5.6
1999 5.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 5.3 5.6
2000 5.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 5.6 5.6
2001 4.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 5.8 5.6
2002 4.5 1.0 3.0 3.0 6.0 5.6
Scenario 3
1997 7.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 5.7 6.0
1998 6.5 1.5 4.0 4.0 6.0 6.8
1999 6.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 6.4 6.8
2000 5.5 1.5 4.0 4.0 6.7 6.8
2001 5.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 7.0 6.8
2002 5.0 1.5 4.0 4.0 7.3 6.8Figure 6.1
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Scenario A Scenario B Scenario Cfrom 5 percent of GDP in 1996 to 4.2 percent of GDP in 2002, in Scenario A, to 4.4 percent in B
and 4.5 percent in C. Something similar happens with the payroll of state and municipal
governments, particularly in the first two scenarios. Social security benefits remain roughly stable
as a proportion of GDP in Scenario A, show a strong upward movement in B, but a much
stronger one in C, increasing by almost one percentage point of GDP over the period. Finally, as a
straightforward consequence of the adopted assumptions, expenditures with health assistance
programs, measured as a proportion of GDP, rise in both Scenarios B and C.
6.2  Debt Dynamics Reexamined
The simulation results just analyzed suggest that the public sector primary-balance path over the
coming years could be quite different from those assumed in the debt-dynamics simulation
exercises of Section 4. A simple comparison between the top left graphs of Figures 4.1 and 6.1
above helps to establish the main differences. Though, as pointed out in the previous section, the
path of Scenario A roughly resembles the one assumed in Scenario 2 of Section 4, none of the
endogenously-generated primary-balance paths are even remotely comparable to the somewhat
optimistic one assumed in Scenario 3. On the other hand, the primary-balance path that comes out
of Scenario C is even worse than the no-improvement path assumed in Scenario 1 of Section 4.
The natural step at this point, therefore, is to run new simulations, based on the endogenously-
generated primary-balance paths, to reexamine some debt-dynamics issues, keeping the same
common set of assumptions of Table 4.2, used in the simulations of Section 4. Results of the new
simulations are presented in a set of graphs in Figure 6.2.
The three endogenous primary-balance paths, presented again in in the top left graph, lead to well
different consequences in terms of debt dynamics. The public-sector net debt, in the lower right
graph, rises very markedly in all three scenarios, even in Scenario A. The reason has much to do
with the effect of the slow pace of primary-balance improvement in Scenario A, that prevents an
earlier fall of the interest rate and lower interest payments in the first part of the period. The net47
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Scenario A Scenario B Scenario Cdebt rises from 34.4 percent of GDP in 1996 to 37.9 percent of GDP in 2002. After increasing in
1997, the operational deficit falls steadily to 1.7 percent of GDP in 2002.
The worst case, of course, is generated by the deteriorating primary balance of Scenario C, which
leads to rising interest rates. Fueled by soaring interest payments, the net debt jumps to 55.9
percent of GDP, and the operational deficit reaches 9.3 percent of GDP in 2002. Scenario B
constitutes an intermediate case, in which the net debt rises to 45.1 percent of GDP and the
operational deficit remain at a level quite similar to the base year value.
6.3  Sensitivity Analysis
Simulation models are particularly useful because they allow a systematic exploration of the
consequences of a set of assumptions. And one of the most fruitful ways to explore those
consequences is resorting to sensitivity analysis. As warned in Section 4, the simulation results
may be highly sensitive to some of the adopted assumptions, particularly to what is being assumed
about the Brazilian economic growth performance during the period. The GDP growth path was
kept invariant in both the simulations discussed in Section 4 and in the present section. Although
that surely allowed an easier interpretation of the results, it led to some inconsistency in the design
of the scenarios. That problem seems to be particularly important in the simulations just discussed,
that involve endogenously generated primary-balance paths. Changing assumptions on the GDP
growth path affects to a great extent both the determination of the primary balance and the debt
dynamics process. Sensitivity analysis exercises are therefore required to gauge the order of
magnitude of the implied alterations in the simulation results.
As shown in Table 4.2 above, all simulation exercises assumed that the annual GDP growth rate
would be 4 percent in 1997 and 4.5 percent from 1998 to 2002. How would the simulations
results be affected if, in Scenario A, that has the best fiscal performance, a more optimistic growth
path were assumed? What would be the effect of assuming, for example, that the GDP growth
rate will increase to 5 percent in 1998, to 6 percent from 1999 to 2001 and then to 7 percent in
2002? The answer is provided in the set of graphs of Figure 6.3, which allows a comparison49
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Scenario A Scenario Dbetween Scenario A and what has been labeled Scenario D, identical to A except for the
assumptions on the expansion of GDP over the period.
For a start, it may be seen that the primary-balance would show a much stronger improvement,
since most expenditures would be increasing well below the GDP growth rate. The 1.6 percent
primary surplus of 2002 would be converted into a 2.6 percent surplus. As that would lead to a
faster fall in interest rates, the end-year operational deficit would not be 1.7 percent of GDP, but
only 0.2 percent. The public-sector interest bill in the end of the period would fall from 3.3 to 2.8
percent of GDP. And the 2002 net debt would reach, not 37.9 percent of GDP, but 32.8
percent.
29 Sensitivity-analysis exercises with the less optimistic scenarios B and C also leave no
doubts about the crucial importance of the assumptions on economic growth performance.
                                               
29 An assumption of a constant 4.5 percent GDP growth rate in Scenario C, which has the worst fiscal
performance, should still be considered very optimistic. Yet its introduction in Scenario C would be enough to
make the net debt jump to 63.3 percent of GDP in 2002.51
7.  CONCLUDING REMARKS
What conclusions about fiscal sustainability in Brazil can be drawn from the previous sections? If
a sustainable fiscal policy is defined as a policy such that the public debt to GDP ratio eventually
converges back to some determined level
30, the answer is clear: the present fiscal stance is not
sustainable. If the current tax rules and spending programs are maintained, the debt to GDP ratio
will grow rapidly in the near future.
Under reasonable sets of assumptions, the simulation exercises of section 5 and 6 have shown that
a sharp increase in the public sector net debt, as a proportion of GDP, will be  unavoidable if there
is no improvement in the primary balance in coming years. But even with a significant
improvement in the primary balance during the period, the net-debt to GDP ratio would still show
an upward trend and public sector real interest payments would not fall, unless extremely
optimistic assumptions on GDP growth are made.
Given the obstacles currently faced by fiscal-adjustment efforts, there is a widespread temptation
in Brazil to believe that the country may simply grow out of its fiscal problems. If fiscal repression
could produce a slowly increasing primary surplus in the near future, one could cross one’s
fingers and hope that economic growth will save the day and lead naturally to a significant
improvement in fiscal indicators. Much as an overfed boy that dreams about getting rid of his
obesity problems by simply maintaining his weight while growing up.
There are many reasons to believe that growing out of fiscal problems in Brazil will not be so
easy. A slow improvement in the fiscal-stance will mean that for a long time interest rates will
have to remain much higher than would be compatible with a growth-conducive economic
environment. In addition, long-lasting fiscal repression means public investment deficiencies that
will also hamper fast economic growth. Finally, the recent evolution of the Brazilian external
accounts, marked by a large and rapidly widening current account deficit, suggests that a faster
                                               
30 Blanchard et al. (1990)52
growth rate will probably be unfeasible. And also that the convergence of domestic interest rates
to international levels may end up being much slower than assumed in the most  optmistic
scenarios of the paper.
It seems, therefore, that there is no easy way out. In order to interrupt the vicious circle of bad
fiscal stance, high interest rates, slow growth and even worse fiscal stance (and greater external
vulnerability), there seems to be no other alternative than a decisive effort to improve the primary
balance.
It is highly unrealistic to expect that the already high tax burden can be further increased.
Improvements in the primary balance will have to come, therefore, from expenditure reduction.
Given the rigidities in the public sector payroll, the fiscal pressure coming from the social security
system and the expansion in expenditures with health assistance programs, it is unlikely that the
necessary expenditure cuts will be viable without a major fiscal reform. There seems to be no way
to circumvent a deep change in the very nature of the fiscal regime that only constitutional




BRAZIL: TOTAL OPERATIONAL AND PRIMARY DEFICITS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR: 1985-1996
(In percent of GDP)
CATEGORY AND LEVEL OF 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
GOVERNMENT
Total Borrowing Requirement 30.24 11.78 33.96 55.88 89.87 32.00 28.25 47.24 65.01 26.49 7.40 6.09
      Federal Government 11.02 5.19 14.58 12.41 55.09 13.26 6.90 16.93 23.97 9.97 2.40 2.64
      States and Municipalities 7.06 2.87 8.57 14.91 17.99 9.30 10.32 17.41 27.24 11.86 3.70 2.81
      Public Enterprises 12.17 3.71 10.80 28.56 16.80 9.44 11.03 12.90 13.80 4.65 1.30 0.64
Monetary Correction 25.57 7.97 27.66 50.97 82.43 33.83 28.05 45.47 64.28 27.61 2.40 2.19
      Federal Government 9.82 3.82 11.28 8.11 50.84 15.76 6.82 16.28 23.36 11.52 0.66 0.94
      States and Municipalities 6.03 1.87 6.79 14.74 17.38 9.30 11.04 16.77 27.15 11.07 1.25 0.91
      Public Enterprises 9.72 2.28 9.59 28.13 14.21 8.78 10.20 12.41 13.77 5.02 0.40 0.31
Operational Deficit 4.67 3.81 6.29 4.90 7.44 -1.83 0.20 1.77 0.73 -1.12 5.00 3.90
      Federal Government 1.20 1.38 3.30 4.30 4.25 -2.50 0.08 0.64 0.61 -1.55 1.74 1.70
      States and Municipalities 1.02 1.00 1.78 0.17 0.60 0.00 -0.72 0.64 0.09 0.79 2.45 1.90
      Public Enterprises 2.45 1.43 1.21 0.43 2.58 0.67 0.84 0.48 0.04 -0.37 0.90 0.33
Interest Payments 7.27 5.41 5.29 5.80 6.44 1.63 3.10 3.37 3.03 4.15 5.26 3.79
      Federal Government 2.80 1.78 1.50 3.30 2.85 -0.94 1.08 1.74 1.51 1.65 2.24 2.07
      States and Municipalities 1.12 0.90 1.18 0.67 0.90 0.20 0.78 0.74 0.69 1.54 2.27 1.32
      Public Enterprises 3.35 2.73 2.61 1.83 2.68 2.37 1.14 0.88 0.84 0.96 0.84 0.40
Primary Deficit -2.60 -1.60 1.00 -0.90 1.00 -3.46 -2.90 -1.60 -2.30 -5.27 -0.26 0.10
      Federal Government -1.60 -0.40 1.80 1.00 1.40 -1.56 -1.00 -1.10 -0.90 -3.19 -0.50 -0.40
      States and Municipalities -0.10 0.10 0.60 -0.50 -0.30 -0.20 -1.50 -0.10 -0.60 -0.75 0.18 0.57
      Public Enterprises -0.90 -1.30 -1.40 -1.40 -0.10 -1.70 -0.30 -0.40 -0.80 -1.33 0.06 -0.07
Source: Secretaria de Política Econômica, Ministério da Fazenda55
TABLE A1.2
BRAZIL: SUMMARY OPERATIONS OF THE PUBLIC SECTOR
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Non-financial Revenue 29.64 34.83 31.12 31.48 31.29 33.04 31.66 32.59
   Tax Revenue 13.88 17.87 14.83 15.48 15.60 18.19 18.68 18.79
      VAT - IPI 2.21 2.52 2.23 2.40 2.44 2.12 2.04 2.03
      Income Tax 4.10 4.27 3.51 3.85 3.89 3.65 4.23 4.16
      Finsocial 1.10 1.02 1.38 1.04 1.37 2.32 2.31 2.37
      PIS/PASEP 0.54 1.20 1.10 1.12 1.16 1.04 0.93 0.98
      IPMF 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.07 1.02 0.02 -0.19
      CSLL 0.21 0.87 0.30 0.75 0.80 0.94 0.89 0.86
      Other Federal Taxes 0.80 1.10 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.10
      State and local Tax Revenue 7.20 9.10 8.48 7.97 7.67 8.17 8.96 9.26
      Minus: Public Enterprises Taxes -2.28 -2.21 -2.87 -2.25 -2.40 -1.97 -1.80 -1.78
   Social Security Contributions 4.47 5.35 4.85 4.79 5.47 4.84 4.89 5.08
   Other Non-Tax Revenue 11.29 11.61 11.44 11.21 10.22 10.01 8.09 8.72
      Federal Government 1.03 2.80 1.14 1.10 1.53 1.74 1.64 1.70
      States and Municipalities 1.60 1.73 2.21 1.77 1.83 1.67 1.64 1.48
      Public Enterprises Value Added 5.12 5.29 6.75 7.36 4.59 5.52 4.21 4.26
      Other Revenue of Public Enterprises 3.54 1.79 1.34 0.98 2.27 1.08 0.60 1.28
Non-financial Expenditure 37.43 38.04 33.60 33.60 35.76 29.92 32.05 33.32
   Current Expenditure 29.88 30.84 26.77 27.21 29.35 25.64 28.10 28.38
      Wages 16.28 15.71 13.37 13.65 13.77 13.00 13.68 13.71
      Goods and Sevices 6.05 5.86 5.79 5.21 6.86 3.73 5.31 5.44
      Pensions and Welfare 4.30 4.59 4.07 5.04 5.57 5.37 5.53 6.00
      Subsidies and other Current Exp 2.70 4.19 2.93 2.67 2.64 2.91 2.84 2.80
      Transfers to Private Sector 0.55 0.49 0.61 0.64 0.51 0.63 0.74 0.43
   Capital Expenditure 7.55 7.20 6.83 6.39 6.41 4.28 3.95 4.94
      Investment 6.62 6.82 6.39 5.91 5.97 4.06 3.68 4.60
      Public Enterprises other Capital Expenditures 0.30 0.24 0.32 0.43 0.40 0.13 0.20 0.33
      Credit Op. Expenditures (POOC) 0.63 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.01
Float and Adjustment 6.79 6.67 5.38 3.72 6.77 2.15 0.65 0.63
Primary Deficit 1.00 -3.46 -2.90 -1.60 -2.30 -5.27 -0.26 0.10
Real Interest Payments 6.44 1.63 3.10 3.37 3.03 4.15 5.26 3.79
Operational Deficit 7.44 -1.83 0.20 1.77 0.73 -1.12 5.00 3.90
Source: Secretaria de Política Econômica, Ministério da Fazenda56
TABLE A1.3
BRAZIL: FEDERAL GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Revenue 14.46 19.13 15.21 15.65 17.33 18.57 18.05 18.09
     Tax Revenue 8.96 10.98 9.22 9.76 10.33 11.99 11.52 11.31
        VAT - IPI 2.21 2.52 2.23 2.40 2.44 2.12 2.04 2.03
        Income Tax 4.1 4.27 3.51 3.85 3.89 3.65 4.23 4.16
        Finsocial 1.1 1.02 1.38 1.04 1.37 2.32 2.31 2.37
        PIS/PASEP 0.54 1.2 1.10 1.12 1.16 1.04 0.93 0.98
        IPMF 0.07 1.02 0.02 -0.19
        CSLL 0.21 0.87 0.30 0.75 0.80 0.94 0.89 0.86
        Other Taxes 0.8 1.1 0.70 0.60 0.60 0.90 1.10 1.10
     Social Security Contributions 4.47 5.35 4.85 4.79 5.47 4.84 4.89 5.08
     Other 1.03 2.8 1.14 1.10 1.53 1.74 1.64 1.70
Expenditure 20.46 20.49 17.77 17.45 20.49 16.21 18.29 18.42
   Current Expenditure 17.77 17.57 15.21 15.68 18.13 15.27 17.26 17.29
       Wages 6.95 6.06 4.54 4.60 4.93 5.00 5.31 5.03
       Goods and Services 3.75 3.34 3.42 2.58 4.38 1.42 3.02 3.14
       Pensions and Welfare 3.8 3.87 3.53 4.45 5.05 4.88 4.95 5.42
       Current Transfers 3.27 4.30 3.72 4.05 3.77 3.97 3.98 3.70
          Intergovernmental Transfers 2.72 3.81 3.11 3.41 3.26 3.34 3.24 3.27
          Other Transfers 0.55 0.49 0.61 0.64 0.51 0.63 0.74 0.43
    Capital Expenditure 2.69 2.92 2.56 1.77 2.36 0.94 1.03 1.13
       Investment 1.60 2.57 1.99 1.60 2.20 0.84 0.95 1.11
      Transfers to P.S Enterprises 0.46 0.21 0.45 0.12 0.12 0.01 0.01 0.01
      Credit Op. Expenditures (POOC) 0.63 0.14 0.12 0.05 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.01
Float and Adjustment 4.60 2.92 3.56 2.90 4.06 0.83 0.74 0.73
Primary Deficit 1.40 -1.56 -1.00 -1.10 -0.90 -3.19 -0.50 -0.40
Real Interest Payments 2.85 -0.94 1.08 -1.74 1.51 1.65 2.24 -2.07
Operational Deficit 4.25 -2.50 0.08 0.64 0.61 -1.55 1.74 1.70
Source: Secretaria de Política Econômica, Ministério da Fazenda57
TABLE A1.4
BRAZIL: SUMMARY OPERATIONS OF STATES AND MUNICIPALITIES
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
Revenue 12.40 14.74 13.81 13.15 12.76 13.34 14.09 14.01
       Tax Revenue 7.20 9.10 8.48 7.97 7.67 8.17 8.96 9.26
            VAT-ICMS 6.1 8 7.07 6.66 6.12 7.01 6.79 7.02
            Others 1.1 1.1 1.41 1.31 1.55 1.16 2.17 2.24
       Nontax Revenue 1.6 1.73 2.21 1.77 1.83 1.67 1.64 1.48
       Intergovernmental Transfers 3.6 3.91 3.12 3.41 3.26 3.50 3.49 3.27
Expenditure 13.40 17.18 14.58 14.72 14.43 13.88 14.19 14.79
       Current Expenditure 11.10 14.64 12.46 12.70 12.36 12.11 12.70 12.97
           Wages 5.6 7.21 6.62 6.81 6.72 6.40 6.99 7.29
           Goods and Sevices 2.3 2.52 2.37 2.63 2.48 2.31 2.29 2.30
           Pensions and Welfare 0.5 0.72 0.54 0.59 0.52 0.49 0.58 0.58
           Subsidies and other Current Exp 2.7 4.19 2.93 2.67 2.64 2.91 2.84 2.80
        Investment 2.3 2.54 2.12 2.02 2.07 1.77 1.49 1.82
Float and Adjustment 1.30 2.64 2.27 1.67 2.27 1.29 -0.08 0.21
Primary Deficit -0.30 -0.20 -1.50 -0.10 -0.60 -0.75 0.18 0.57
Real Interest Payments 0.90 0.20 0.78 0.74 0.69 1.54 2.27 1.32
Operational Deficit 0.60 0.00 -0.72 0.64 0.09 0.79 2.45 1.90
Source: Secretaria de Política Econômica, Ministério da Fazenda58
TABLE A1.5
BRAZIL: SUMMARY OPERATIONS OF PUBLIC SECTOR ENTERPRISES
(In percent of GDP)
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996
           Sales of Goods and Services 11.20 9.90 12.60 12.40 8.30 8.70 7.00 7.61
       Wages 3.73 2.44 2.21 2.24 2.12 1.6 1.38 1.39
       Other Current Expenditure 8.36 6.82 8.72 7.29 6.11 5.15 4.59 5.13
            Materials and Supplies 3.37 2.01 2.48 2.03 2.16 1.87 1.50
            Services 1.41 1.10 1.09 0.83 0.96 0.84 0.80
            Taxes 2.28 2.21 2.87 2.25 2.40 1.97 1.80 1.78
            Others 1.30 1.50 2.28 2.18 0.60 0.47 0.50
      Public Enterprises Value Added 7.94
Source: Secretaria de Política Econômica, Ministério da Fazenda59
APPENDIX 2
ESTIMATION OF ALTERNATIVE FISCAL POLICY INDICATORS
A2.1 Adjusted Primary Deficit and Fiscal Impulse Measure
The starting point for the construction of the alternative fiscal policy indicators of Section 3 was
the estimation of inflation and GDP elasticities of  tax revenues and expenditures.
 31 For each of
the categories of taxes and expenditures,  a OLS regression was run with the following
specification:
lnA  =    +   lnY ln  +   t   t   t a b g p e + t
where At  represents the specific category, Yt stands for real GDP, p t is the inflation rate, and et  is
an error term.
Monthly tax revenues and expenditures data covering the period from January 1989 to December
1996 were first converted to constant prices (December 1996), using the geometric average of the
General Price Index (IGP-DI) for the current and the previous month, and then aggregated to
generate the quarterly tax revenues and expenditures series. All regressions were then estimated
with quarterly data (1989.I to 1996.IV).
Some of the regressions showed evidence of first-order serial correlation and were reestimated
using the maximum likelihood procedure of Beach and MacKinnon (1978).
32 In addition, when
the estimated coefficient of one of the explanatory variables had very little statistical significance,
the variable was dropped from the regression.
                                               
31 For earlier attempts to estimate the response of federal revenues and expenditures to macroeconomic variables
see, respectively,  Muriel (1996) and Pereira (1996).
32 In fact, preliminary inspection of the series suggested that some of them are not stationary. The small span
covered by the data, however, raises questions about the adequacy of a cointegration analysis.60
Most of the regressions refer to the federal government. For the state and municipal governments
the only series that was available on a frequency higher than a year was the Value-Added Tax
(ICMS). There was no monthly or quarterly information on the required series for state-owned
enterprises.
Estimation results for the series that were significantly related to either one of the explanatory
variables are presented in Table A2.1.The adjusted tax revenue and expenditures figures were
obtained as the fitted values of the regressions in Table A2.1 using as explanatory variables the
inflation rate and/or the GDP of the previous year:
lnA  =    + lnY  + ln t t-4 t-4 $ $ $ $ a b g p
In the cases in which there was a correction for first-order serial correlation of the error terms the
fitted values were generated as:
lnA  =  (1- )  + lnY  - lnY ) + ln - ln ) t t-4 t-5  t-4 t-5  $ $ $ $( $ $( $ r a b r g p r p
where  $ r  is the estimated correlation coefficient between errors in period t and period t-1. Figures
A2.1 to A2.8 present the actual and adjusted values for the different series.
The adjusted public sector primary deficit was then calculated aggregating the adjusted tax
revenues and expenditures for the federal government and state and municipal governments to the
unadjusted primary deficit of the state owned enterprises. The difference between the actual and
the adjusted deficit in each year is decomposed into revenues and expenditures in Table A2.2. The
quarterly fiscal impulse measure was obtained as:
FI =  (G   -  T   -   (G   -  T t t t-4 t-4 $ $ ) )61
where  G   - T t-4 t-4 and  $ $ G   -  T t t are, respectively, the actual primary deficit and the adjusted
primary deficit. Figures A2.9 and A2.10 present quarterly values for the actual and adjusted
deficits, as well as the change in the primary deficit and the estimated fiscal impulse measure.
Table A2.1
Estimation Results
Const. Y p r Adj. R



































































0.97 2.00 0.19 944.5
Note: t statistics in parenthesis
Sources: Tax Revenues and Expenditures: Central Bank of Brazil; GDP: index of quarterly real
GDP from IBGE; Inflation: Quarterly Inflation Rate of the geometric average of the General Price
Index (IGP-DI), calculated as: {[(quarter t geometric average of the geometric average of the
General Price Index (IGP-DI)/ (quarter t-1 geometric average of the geometric average of the
General Price Index (IGP-DI)-1]*100}Table A2.2
Decomposition of the Difference between the Adjusted and the Actual Deficit
89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 Mean St. Dev.
      Deficit:
         Adjusted - Actual
1.70 1.76 -0.80 -0.47 0.18 1.23 0.79 0.66 0.63 0.95
 Revenues:
   Actual  - Adjusted
2.41 1.86 -1.47 -0.40 0.50 1.83 1.59 0.88 0.90 1.31
 Expenditures:
   Adjusted - Actual
-0.71 -0.10 0.67 -0.07 -0.32 -0.60 -0.80 -0.22 -0.27 0.47
A2.2 Underlying Primary Deficit
The starting point for the derivation of the underlying public sector primary deficit was the
application of the Hodrick-Prescott filter to the seasonally adjusted quarterly real GDP series,
with the goal of extracting its trend component.
33 Figure A2.11 presents the actual, seasonally
adjusted and “filtered” GDP series. After the GDP trend was extracted, the estimated equations
from the previous sub-section were used to adjust the revenue values and calculate the underlying
deficit. The adjusted tax revenue figures were obtained as the fitted values of the regressions in
Table A2.1 using the GDP trend as explanatory variable. Figures A2.12 to A2.19 present the
actual and “underlying” values for the different revenue series. The underlying primary deficit was
obtained adding to these series the remaining revenue series and subtracting the expenditure series
from it. Figure A2.19 presents quarterly values for the actual and underlying primary deficits.
                                               
33 The idea is to decompose an observed series yt into a trend component mt and a stationary component
yt  - mt . Consider the sum of squares


















- ￿ ￿ - + - - - m l m m m m63
Figure  A2.1
Income Tax
















89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96
Actual Adjusted
                                                                                                                                                      
The problem involves finding a  mt which minimizes this expression. The constant l is arbitrarily chosen and
reflects the cost of incorporating fluctuations in the trend. In this paper, with quarterly data, the value of l was set64
Figure  A2.3
Import Tax
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at 1,600, following Hodrick and Prescott (1981).65
Figure  A2.5
Contribution on Profits 
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Actual Adjusted67
Figure  A2.9
Primary Deficit  
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Figure  A2.10
Actual Change in Primary Deficit  and Fiscal Impulse Measure
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Figure A2.11
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Figure A2.12 Income Tax
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Actual Underlying72
Figure  A2.19
Primary Deficit  
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APPENDIX 3: THE SIMULATION MODEL
In the model used for the debt-dynamics simulations of Section 5, the public sector net-debt is
separated into three components: local-currency denominated registered net-debt (BR), foreign-
currency denominated registered net-debt (BRD) and external net-debt (D).
34 All debt-stock
variables are defined as a proportion of GDP. As r* is the external interest rate paid on D, the real
interest rate on that debt can be written as r*(1 + e)  + (e - p), where e is the rate of depreciation
of the domestic currency and  p is the inflation rate.
35 Accordingly, as the local-currency
denominated net-debt pays an interest r above the monetary correction of the debt, the relevant
real interest is given by r(1 + p).
36 All interest rates are referred to a basic exogenous external rate
re. The highest spread s is paid on BR. Given the covered exchange-rate risk,   a smaller spread
W s  is paid on BRD,  where  0 < W < 1. A fixed spread se is paid on D, since the current cost of
the external net-debt is highly dominated by the cost of Brady bonds and the returns on the stock
of foreign reserves.
The public sector operational balance, as a proportion of GDP, may therefore be written as
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where d is the primary balance, the other three terms in the right hand side are the public sector
interest payments, and g is the real GDP growth rate.
                                               
34 The reasons for avoiding the traditional disaggregation into federal, state & municipal and public enterprises’
debt have already been discussed in Section 5.
35 From (1 + r*)(1 + e) - (1 + p).
36 From (1 + r)(1 + p) - (1 + p).74
As explained in Section 5.2, it is reasonable to suppose that a sounder fiscal stance, as measured
by the primary balance, should open room for lower interest rates. The model therefore simply
determines the interest spread s as an isoelastic decreasing function of the primary balance.  The
sensitiveness of the simulation results to different views on the likely response of interest rates to
an improvement in fiscal stance may be easily explored by simply changing the value of the
elasticity a in
[ ] ( , ) 2                     s s t t = d a
The debt stocks are determined in the next three equations. The change in the total net-debt
depends on the operational balance dop as well as on three other factors: the expected value of
public assets sales  AS, the expected emergence of contingent and hidden liabilities  BH and
seigniorage. The resulting change in indebtedness  is assumed to be distributed in fixed
proportions, f and (1- f), between BR and BRD. The local-currency denominated registered net-
debt in period t+1 is therefore written as
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where m is the part of the privatization proceeds that is effectively set aside for debt redemption,
M is the monetary base and seigniorage is given by the last term on right-hand side bracket. The
impact of public-assets sales on the net-debt is amplified by the “debt reclassification” parameter
g.
37 In turn, the foreign-currency denominated registered net-debt evolves according to
                                               
37 Given the peculiarities of public-debt accounting in Brazil, when a public enterprise is privatized its whole debt
is reclassified and written off from the the public sector net-debt statistics. Therefore, each billion of privatization
proceeds may end up reducing the net debt by more than m times one billion. The intensity of this additional
“reclassification effect” on the net debt is measured by g. It may be easily shown that g =r/[L.(1-r)], where r is the
leverage ratio of the privatized enterprise (debt/assets) and L is the part of its equity that is being transferred to the
private sector. See Werneck (1997).        75
[ ]
( )( )
















        
                                                                                                                      
BRD
g


























f d m g
p
p






















The determination of the public sector primary balance, as discussed in Section 6 above, is based
on the following three equations. The federal primary balance is given by
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And the primary balance of state and municipal governments is determined by
[ ]
( )( )
[ ( )( ) ( )( )
( )( ) ( )( ) )( )




1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1
1 1 1 1
1 1 1
1 1 1 1
1
         = t
                                         -(1+





t p tu p
p u w p
p p
+ +
￿ + ￿ + + + + +
+ + + - + + + -
- + + - + +
+ +
+ + + +
+ + +
+ + + +
+
g
g tr g svat
g ot w g gs
g ie g
t t
t t t t t t
t t t SM SM SM t SM
t t SM t t
t t t t
t ) ] oeSMt
                         
The public sector primary balance is, of course, simply given by76
     [8]             d d d d t t t t F SM PE = + +
where the dPE, the public enterprises’ primary balance, is treated as an exogenous variable.
Parameters and variables involved in equations [6] and [7] are defined in Table A3.1.
Table A.3.1
List of Variables and Parameters of the Simulation Model
Symbol Endogenous Variables
dop Public sector operational balance
s Interest spread on registered local-currency denominated public sector debt
r Interest rate on local-currency denominated public-sector debt
BR Registered local-currency denominated public sector debt
BRD Registered foreign-currency denominated public sector debt
D Public sector net external debt
dF Federal government primary balance
tr Federal government gross tax revenue
w Federal government active-personnel payroll
wR Federal government retired-personnel payroll
ssb Social security benefits
ie Investment expenditures
he Health assistance programs expenditures
oe Other nonfinancial expenditures
dSM State and municipal governments primary balance
svat State value added tax revenue
ot Revenue from other state and municipal taxes
wSM Payroll of State and Municipal Governments
gsSM Expenditures of state and municipal governments with goods and services
ieSM Capital expenditures of state and municipal governments
oeSM Other expenditures of state and municipal governments
d Public sector primary balance
Symbol Exogenous Variables
re External interest rate
e Nominal depreciation rate
p Inflation rate
g GDP growth rate





List of Variables and Parameters of the Simulation Model
Parameters
se Interest spread paid on external debt
W Ratio between interest spreads paid on foreign-currency and local-currency denominated debts
a Elasticity of the spread function
f Fraction of borrowing requirements financed by issuing BRD
m Fraction of privatization proceeds used for debt redemption
g “Debt-reclassification” effect parameter
tSM Revenue sharing parameter
t GDP-elasticity of the federal tax revenue
u Federal active-personnel payroll quantum growth rate
w Nominal rate of change of  salaries of the federal active personnel
uR Federal retired-personnel payroll quantum growth rate
wR Nominal rate of change of  salaries of the federal retired personnel
x Social security-benefits quantum growth rate
wm Nominal rate of change of the minimum wage
y Real growth rate of federal investment expenditures
h Health-assistance programs quantum growth rate
k Real growth rate of other federal expenditures
tn GDP-elasticity of the state value added tax revenue
uSM State and municipal payroll quantum growth rate
wSM Nominal rate of change of the salaries of state and municipal employees78
REFERENCES
Além, A. C. and F. Giambiagi (1997). “A Despesa Previdenciária no Brasil: Evolução, Diagnóstico e
Perspectiva”. Departamento Econômico, BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, mimeo..
Bacha, E. (1995). “O Fisco e a Inflação: Uma Interpretação do Caso Brasileiro”, Revista de Economia
Política, Vol. 14, N. 1, janeiro-março.
Bacha, E. and B. Lamounier (1992). “Redemocratization and the Impasse of Economic Reform in Brazil”.
Paper presented at the Overseas Development Council Workshop in Rio de Janeiro.
Barbosa, F. and F. Giambiagi (1995). “O Ajuste Fiscal de 1990-93: Uma Análise Retrospectiva”, Revista
Brasileira de Economia, Vol. 49, No. 3, julho-setembro.
Beach, C. and J.  MacKinnon (1978). “A Maximum Likelihood Procedure for Regression with
Autocorrelated Errors”, Econometrica, Vol. 46, No. 1, January.
Blanchard, O. (1990). “Suggestions for a New Set of Fiscal Indicators”, OECD Economics and Statistics
Department, Working Paper No. 79, April.
Blanchard, O. , J.C. Chouraqui, R. Hagemann and N. Sartor (1990). “The Sustainability of Fiscal Policy: New
Answers to an Old Question”, OECD Economic Studies, No. 15, Autumn.
Buiter, W. H. (1983). "Measurement of the Public Sector Deficit and Its Implications for Policy Evaluation and
Design", IMF Staff Papers, Vol. 30, No. 2, June.
Carneiro, D. and M. P. Garcia (1994). “Flujos de Capital y Control  Monetário  Bajo  Sustitución de
Importación Doméstica de Dinero: La Reciente Experiência Brasileña”, in R. Steiner (ed.). Afluencia de
Capitales y Estabilización en América Latina. Bogotá: Fedesarrollo.
Carneiro, D. and R. L. F. Werneck (1993). "Obstacles to Investment Resumption in Brazil”, in E. Bacha
(ed.). Savings and Investment Requirements for the Resumption of Growth in Latin America. Washington,
D.C.: IDB/The Johns Hopkins University Press.
Chand, S. K. (1992). “Fiscal Impulses and Their Fiscal Impact”, IMF Working Paper No. 92/38, May.
Faria, L. V (1996). “Política Fiscal: O Déficit é Tudo?”, Conjuntura Econômica, abril.
Furugem, A. S., L. P.  Pessôa and S. Abe (1996). “Dívida  Pública  Líquida:  Evolução 1982-95 e
Perspectivas de Curto Prazo”, Research, Banco de Investimento Garantia, março.
Giambiagi, F. (1996). “Cenários  para as  Contas  Públicas: 1996/2002”.  Pesquisa e  Planejamento
Econômico, Vol. 26, N. 2, agosto.
Giambiagi, F. (1997). “Necessidades de  Financiamento do  Setor  Público 1991/1996 - Bases  para a
Discussão do Ajuste Fiscal no Brasil”. Departamento Econômico, BNDES, Rio de Janeiro, mimeo..79
Hodrick, R. J., and E. C. Prescott (1980). “Postwar U.S. Business Cycles: An Empirical Investigation”,
Discussion Paper No. 451, Carnegie-Mellon University.
Ministério da Previdência e Assistência Social (1997). Livro Branco da Previdência Social. Brasília.
Muriel, B. (1996). “Determinación de los Efectos del Producto e Inflación sobre el Nivel de Recaudaciones”,
Departamento de Economia, PUC-Rio, mimeo., novembro.
Oliveira, F. E. B. and K. I. Beltrão (1995). “A Reforma da Seguridade Social no Brasil”, Research, Banco de
Investimento Garantia, julho.
Pastore, A. C. and M. C.  Pinotti (1997). “Inflação e  Estabilização:  Algumas  Lições  da  Experiência
Brasileira”, paper presented in the 1997 Meeting of the Latin American and Caribbean Economic
Association, held in Bogotá, Colombia.
Pereira, R. M. (1996). “O  Ajustamento  Cíclico dos  Gastos  Públicos  Brasileiros”,  Departamento de
Economia, PUC-Rio, mimeo., novembro
Piancastelli, M. and F. Pereira (1996). “Gasto Público Federal: Análise da despesa Não-Financeira”, Texto
para Discussão N. 431, Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica Aplicada, agosto.
Rigueira, H. (1997). “Previdência dos Estados e Municípios”, O Estado de São Paulo, 22 de janeiro.
Velloso, R. (1996a). “Situação Fiscal em 1995 e Perspectivas”, Instituto Nacional de Altos Estudos, junho,
mimeo..
Velloso, R. (1996b). “Rumo ao Déficit Público Sustentável (1996-1997)”, setembro, mimeo..
Werneck, R. L. F. (1986). “Poupança  Estatal,  Dívida  Externa e  Crise  Financeira do  Setor  Público”,
Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, Vol. 16, No. 3.
Werneck, R. L. F. (1988). "Um Modelo de Simulação para Análise do Financiamento do Setor Público",
Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, vol. 18, n. 3, dezembro.
Werneck, R. L. F. (1991). "Public Sector Adjustment to External Shocks and Domestic Pressures, 1970-
85", in M. Selowsky and F. Larrain (eds.), The Public Sector and the Latin American Crisis, 1970-1985.
San Francisco: International Center for Economic Growth.
Werneck, R. L. F. (1997). “Privatização e Dívida Líquida do Setor Público”, O Estado de S. Paulo, May
16, 1997.